Who are we and where do we stand?

Who are we and where do we stand?

Postby lone wolf » Fri Feb 11, 2011 12:30 am

What does this all mean?


"Who You Are" or "Where You Stand"!



The following presentation is based on two things. 1. The dimension of Gods Kingdom vs the boundaries of a judge in the (he names as his) court. 2. In respect of point one defines the relationship of a person with his God and desponds their use of the straw man and their lawful right to engage the straw man for business.



In essence, the issue of "who you are" as compared to "where you stand", may be summed up in the following statement: "By declaring and or by defining who you are, you do not define where you stand, but when you declare where you stand, you have also concurrently defined who you are without discussing the matter."



In other words, when I inform a judge by declaring to him that I stand in the Kingdom of God, and ask him to declare to me whether or not his court stands in God's Kingdom, that judge already knows that I am a real, live man of God, and he knows that I am not a "straw-man", without my having ever brought up that issue.



However, if I declare to that same judge that I am not a straw man, or that I am not a corporate persona of the state and that I am a real live man of God, that judge still has every right according to man's law to do everything in his power to entice me into volunteering to enter into "his" jurisdiction. The public record is replete with examples of men and women that have rightly declared that they are real live men or women of God, yet, these same men or women have been subsequently tricked into volunteering to step into the judge's jurisdiction, simply because they did not know where they should be standing! In fact, the mere act of your offering evidence in the form of argument over the issue of the "name" implies that you have tacitly and obviously unwittingly, accepted the judge's alleged authority to rule on that issue!



In short, "who you are" is an issue designed to aid in the court's trickery. That is why they always start with that issue by asking for a "name", or confirmation of a name. Virtually any response you offer in direct response to the issue of a name, can only be accepted by them as an offer of evidence concerning the issue of the "name", not the issue of jurisdiction. Even if you "win" the argument with your evidence of "who you are", or "who you are not", you still have not dealt with the more important issue of "where you stand", and in fact you have volunteered to enter their jurisdiction but only as a "man"! Again, the public record is replete with examples where the courts have ruled against real live men and women of God for this very reason.



By ignoring the issue of the name; by not responding to it at all; by simply going right to the issue of "where you stand", YOU will be the one trapping the judge as opposed to him potentially trapping you into his jurisdiction. The judge will not be able to tell you that his court stands in God's Kingdom any more than he will be able to tell you it does not stand in God's Kingdom, and until he addresses your simple question of where his court stands, he does not have any jurisdiction to continue with his quest to have you address "his" issue of a name.



Why do you think the police, the prosecutors, the courts, or all of the other "persons", always ask you what your name is? Why do you think they persist on this issue so adamantly, often demanding that you "give them your name"? The answer may surprise you.



They really do not care who you are, but they really do care "where" you are! And in most cases, they do know the difference! Basically, they only have jurisdiction over you as a man when you offer to "go" someplace with them. You must "go" into their jurisdiction before they have any control over you. Your name, whether or not it is in upper, or lower case or some mixture thereof, is not the real issue. Whether you are a man of God or a "straw-man" cannot really be the issue, because YOU cannot be a straw man even if you wanted to be. Your "standing" is the issue!



There are only two possible places for you to "stand". You have your entitlement to God's gift of being able to stand in God's Kingdom. And you have the option of "stepping" out of God's Kingdom and into the kingdoms of man. There are many ways the tricksters may utilize to induce, coerce, intimidate or influence you to step into one of their imaginary "kingdoms", but the result is always the same. The principle result of stepping into any one of their jurisdictions, is that you have voluntarily stepped out of God's Kingdom - the only true sanctuary.



Think of this. I am a man of God and everywhere I go I am standing in God's Kingdom. An officer of some man's court asks me to attend at his court. When I walk into a room that he alleges to be his court, even at his request, I have not yet stepped into his jurisdiction, because I am always standing in God's Kingdom. It then is of no significance what my name is or how it is written, but it is then of paramount importance that I make my declaration of WHERE I am standing! Anyone in that room may ask me my name. My response is simple and straight-forward. "I am a man of God standing in God's Kingdom, where do you stand?" Or I might say; "I am a man of God standing in God's Kingdom, where are you?"



Of course there are many possible responses that a statement such as this may elicit. One of the most probable responses, is for the judge to say something like this; "This is my court and you are in my court." He may even demand that because he "says" you are standing in his court, that you "give the court your name". There are also many possible responses you might offer. For example, "I am in God's Kingdom and my name is not for you, do you not have a name of your own?" Or I might say; "I am in God's Kingdom and you say this is your court, please explain to me where your court is (or where your court stands)?" If he says his court is "right here", then I might say; "I am standing in God's Kingdom, are you also?"



The bottom line with this truthful reasoning is simple. I will always be standing in God's Kingdom and that is all I am required to declare. Without exception, I will only ask him where he is standing or if he is standing in God's Kingdom or where his court stands. I might even walk over to his side on his bench if he says something like "my court is right here in this room (or this room is my court)." If I did walk to his place ("right here") behind his bench, then he will undoubtedly ask me to go back to what he will claim to be "my place", or order me to "stand there", to which I would simply ask; "Is that your court over there because a moment ago you said this right here (point to where he sits) was your court. Is your court in God's kingdom, because I stand in God's Kingdom?"



If I was in a challenging mood, I might ask the judge; "Can you show me where God's Kingdom ends and your court begins, because at this time I stand in God's Kingdom and I do not understand where your court is?" Do you think he will declare that God's Kingdom ends outside of his alleged court room? You might hope so but do not count on it. If he did make such an unlikely statement, my response would be; "I assure you that I am standing in God's Kingdom, therefore your opinion of God's Kingdom is mistaken. You say your court is not in God's Kingdom then I am not in your court and I am not able to understand where your court is."



Now you might conclude that many possible variations of dialogue could ensue. It does not matter what the court officers state, so long as I maintain my simple declaration of being a man standing in God's Kingdom. My declaration is true, it is sound, and above all, no man can prove it to be otherwise. The judge can never bring himself to acknowledge that he is attempting to operate outside of God's Kingdom, hence the judge will never gain jurisdiction over me. And he cannot confirm that he is willing to operate inside of God's Kingdom, because inside of God's Kingdom the judge is merely another man and no man has been granted authority over another by God.



Which brings up one more point. I may ask the judge something like; "Are you a judge in (this) your court that you cannot find for me?" If he says; "I am a judge in this (or my) court", then I would respond with; "You testify that you are therefore not a man and that you do not stand in God's Kingdom, as God alone declares Himself as Judge in His Kingdom. As I am now standing in God's Kingdom, I bid you farewell and may God bless you with understanding of His Kingdom."



You might also consider that upon making your declaration of where YOU stand, that you add the following underlined words: "I am a man of God standing in God's Kingdom, and I can only see other men, my brothers standing in this room with me in God's Kingdom." This will leave the judge in the very uncomfortable and inescapable position of not being able to respond in either the affirmative or the negative. He will try to simply ignore your statement.



He cannot agree that he and the other court officers are also "men of God", as in so doing, he would be negating his own alleged authority. He also cannot disagree with you and say that he and the other court officers are not of God's Kingdom, because this would be tantamount to admitting Treason and breach of Office (in spite of it being true). Because he cannot then identify who HE is, you cannot understand how he can proceed and you state this to him. Then you have him in the position where his only choice of action is to dismiss the court room because he literally cannot make a response that will not cause him infinitely more grief than what he and his court officers intended to inflict upon you.

Gods Kingdom & your standing
any comments ;-)
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Lack of Standing & Void Judgments



The following cases have been compiled here as an attempt to

understand how differing states view the relationship between: (1)

a plaintiff in a lawsuit lacking standing to bring the action, and

(2) the court in which such a lawsuit is filed lacking subject matter

jurisdiction to entertain the suit by reviewing the comments of the

various courts in some relatively recent decisions. All cases are

available free online at FindLaw.com and/or at LexisOne Free Case

Law (each service may require free registration).



Unless otherwise noted, any bold text contained below is my own

emphasis, not contained in the text of the case, which I add for

ease in my future reference.

----------------------------------

Alabama:



Cadle Co. v. Shabani, 1070116, 2008 Ala. LEXIS 189 (2008): ·

Standing is "'"[t]he requisite personal interest that must exist at

the commencement of the litigation."'" Pharmacia Corp. v. Suggs,

932 So. 2d 95, 98 (Ala. 2005) (quoting In re Allison G., 276

Conn. 146, 156, 883 A. 2d 1226, 1231 (2005), quoting in turn

H. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 Yale

L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)). "When a party without standing purports

to commence an action, the trial court acquires no subject-matter

jurisdiction." State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d

1025, 1028 (Ala. 1999). The jurisdictional defect resulting from

the plaintiff's lack of standing cannot be cured by amending

the complaint to add a party having standing. Id. ("[A] pleading

purporting to amend a complaint, which complaint was filed by a

party without standing, cannot relate back to the filing of the

original complaint, because there is nothing 'back' to which to

relate."). See also Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Vann,

344 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (1977) ("We are unaware of any case where any

court has reached a substantive issue absent a named plaintiff who

has standing at the time the action was filed.")

***



· When the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction is noticed by,

or pointed out to, the trial court, that court has no jurisdiction

to entertain further motions or pleadings in the case. It can

do nothing but dismiss the action forthwith. "'Any other action

taken by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is null and

void.'" Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d at 1029 (quoting Beach v. Director

of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).



Hawaii: Hawai'i Med. Ass'n v. Hawai'i Med. Serv. Ass'n, 113

Hawai'i 77, 94, 148 P.3d 1179, 1196 (2006): · "This court has long

acknowledged that standing is that aspect of justiciability focusing

on the party seeking a forum rather than on the issue he or she wants

adjudicated." Sierra Club v. Hawai'i Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai'i 242,

271, 59 P.3d 877, 906 (2002) (brackets, citation, and internal

quotation marks omitted); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498,

95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975) ("In essence the question

of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court

decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues."). It is

well-settled that courts must determine as a threshold matter whether

they have jurisdiction to decide the issues presented. Pub. Access

Shoreline Hawai'i v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 79 Hawai'i 425,

431, 903 P.2d 1246, 1252 (1995).



· If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject

matter jurisdiction to determine the action. See Pele Defense Fund

v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 67, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213

(1994). Thus, "[i]f a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject

matter of a proceeding, any judgment rendered in that proceeding

is invalid." Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 76 Hawai'i 128, 133,

870 P.2d 1272, 1277 (1994).



· "In determining whether [the plaintiff] has standing, we look

solely to whether [the plaintiff] is the proper plaintiff in this

case, without regard to the merits of the allegations [in the

complaint]." Hawai'i Thousand Friends v. Anderson, 70 Haw. 276,

281, 768 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1989). Further, although lack of standing

is raised by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing that he or she has standing. Sierra Club,

100 Hawai'i at 250, 59 P.3d at 885.



Massachusetts: Southwick v. Planning Bd., No. 07-P-251., 72

Mass. App. Ct. 266; 891 N.E.2d 239; 2008 Mass. App. LEXIS 783,

(Mass App. Ct. July 24, 2008): · The judge may have been under

the impression that the plaintiff's standing remained a live issue

at the rule 60(b) stage, as reflected by his observation that the

lack of standing was not a mere technical defect in the plaintiff's

lawsuit, but rather an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See

Planning Bd. of Marshfield v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Pembroke,

427 Mass. 699, 703, 695 N.E.2d 650 (1998). However, standing is

an issue of subject matter jurisdiction only in the sense that it

is a criterion that must be met in order for the court to exercise

jurisdiction, when the court otherwise is competent to decide the

case. See Sarin v. Ochsner, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 421, 424, 721 N.E.2d

932 (2000). See also Nickerson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Raynham,

53 Mass. App. Ct. 680, 681 n.2, 761 N.E.2d 544 (2002). Once a

court has rendered judgment, and opportunities for appeal have

been exhausted, a subsequent showing that the plaintiff did not,

in fact, have standing does not mean that the judgment is void and

must be vacated; the judgment is immune from postjudgment attack

unless the court's exercise of jurisdiction constituted a "clear

usurpation of power." Sarin v. Ochsner, supra at 424, quoting from

Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys., 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st Cir. 1972).



· Here, the court undoubtedly was competent to decide the case. See

G. L. c. 41, § 81BB (permitting appeals from planning board

decisions concerning subdivision plans to be brought in Superior

Court or Land Court). Furthermore, until the trust's right of

redemption was foreclosed, the plaintiff was entitled to rely upon

the trust's interest in the lot as a basis for standing. See Hanna

v. Framingham, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 420, 425, 802 N.E.2d 1061

(2004). Thus, even assuming that the plaintiff had no alternative

basis for standing, there was, at most, an error in the continued

exercise of subject matter jurisdiction after September 22, 2003,

when the right of redemption was foreclosed, but there was no "clear

usurpation of power" by the court. See generally Harris v. Sannella,

400 Mass. 392, 395, 509 N.E.2d 916 (1987); O'Dea v. J.A.L., Inc.,

30 Mass. App. Ct. 449, 455, 569 N.E.2d 841 (1991).



Mississippi: Kirk v. Pope, NO. 2005-CA-02164-SCT, 973 So. 2d 981;

2007 Miss. LEXIS 692 (Miss. 2007): · A real-party-in-interest

defense must be timely and may be waived if tardily asserted. Gogolin

& Stelter v. Karn's Auto Imports, Inc., 886 F.2d 100, 102 (5th

Cir. 1989); see also Rogers v. Samedan Oil Corp., 308 F.3d 477,

483-84 (5th Cir. 2002) (failure to raise the assertion that plaintiff

was not the real party in interest until day before trial constituted

waiver); United HealthCare Corp. v. American Trade Ins. Co., 88

F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 1996) (assertion at pretrial conference

constituted waiver); Hefley v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1383, 1388 (10th

Cir. 1982) (assertion sixteen days before trial is untimely). Because

the earliest Pope alluded to a possible real-party-in-interest

defense was after jury selection and just prior to the start of the

trial, we find that Pope waived any real-party-in-interest defense.



While Pope waived any real-party-in-interest defense, standing

is a "jurisdictional issue which may be raised by any party or

the Court at any time." City of Madison v. Bryan, 763 So. 2d 162,

166 (Miss. 2000) (citing Williams v. Stevens, 390 So. 2d 1012,

1014 (Miss. 1980)).P23. To have standing, this Court has stated,

"there must be a present, existent actionable title or interest

which must be completed at the time the cause of action is

filed." Id. at 165 (quoting Crawford Commercial Constructors,

Inc. v. Marine Indus. Residential Insulation, Inc., 437 So. 2d 15,

16 (Miss. 1983)). Kirk had a valid cause of action for breach

of contract when he first filed suit and therefore initially

had standing to pursue the claim. However, once Kirk filed his

bankruptcy petition, he could have standing only if there was

a proper ratification by the bankruptcy trustee.



Missouri: Chipman v. Counts, 104 S.W.3d 441, 448 (Mo. App. 2003): ·

Respondent is correct in stating that "standing is a jurisdictional

matter antecedent to the right to relief." Farmer v. Kinder, 89

S.W. 3d 447, 451 (Mo. banc 2002) (citing State ex rel. Williams

v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 227 n.6 (Mo. banc 1982)). To determine a

party's standing is to "ask[] whether the person[] seeking relief

[has] a right to do so." Id. (citing State ex rel. Twenty-Second

Judicial Circuit v. Jones, 823 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo. banc 1992)). If

a court determines a party lacks standing, it "must dismiss the

case because it does not have jurisdiction of the substantive

issues presented." Id. (citing State ex rel. Ryan v. Carnahan,

960 S.W.2d 549, 550 (Mo.App. E.D. 1998); Rule 55.27(g)(3)).



Missouri: Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W. 3d 447 (Mo. banc 2002): ·

Standing is a jurisdictional matter antecedent to the right to

relief. State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 227, n.6

(Mo. banc 1982). It asks whether the persons seeking relief have

a right to do so. State ex rel. Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit

v. Jones, 823 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo. banc 1992). Where, as here,

a question is raised about a party's standing, courts have a duty

to determine the question of their jurisdiction before reaching

substantive issues, for if a party lacks standing, the court must

dismiss the case because it does not have jurisdiction of the

substantive issues presented. State ex rel. Ryan v. Carnahan, 960

S.W.2d 549, 550 (Mo. App. 1998); Rule 55.27(g)(3). Lack of standing

cannot be waived. Foreclosure for Delinquent Land Taxes by Action

in REM, 947 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Mo. App. 1997).



Nebraska: Myers v. Neb. Inv. Council, No. S-05-532., 272 Neb. 669;

724 N.W.2d 776; 2006 Neb. LEXIS 170 (December 8, 2006): · Standing

is the legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject

matter of the controversy, which entitles a party to invoke the

jurisdiction of the court. Adam v. City of Hastings, 267 Neb. 641,

676 N.W.2d 710 (2004). Standing is fundamental to a court's exercise

of jurisdiction, and either a litigant or a court before which a case

is pending can raise the question of standing at any time during the

proceeding. Smith v. City of Papillion, 270 Neb. 607, 705 N.W.2d 584

(2005). Standing is a jurisdictional component of a party's case

because only a party who has standing may invoke the jurisdiction

of a court. Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, 263 Neb. 920, 644 N.W.2d 540

(2002). As an aspect of jurisdiction and justiciability, standing

requires that a litigant have a personal stake in the outcome of

a controversy: a personal stake that would warrant invocation of

a court's jurisdiction and justify the exercise of the court's

remedial powers on the litigant's behalf. Id.



Nebraska: Adam v. City of Hastings, 267 Neb. 641, 676 N.W.2d 710

(2004): · Standing is the legal or equitable right, title, or

interest in the subject matter of the controversy which entitles

a party to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Crosby v. Luehrs,

supra; Hradecky v. State, 264 Neb. 771, 652 N.W.2d 277

(2002). Standing relates to a court's power, that is, jurisdiction,

to address the issues presented and serves to identify those

disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial

process. Governor's Policy Research Office v. KN Energy, 264

Neb. 924, 652 N.W.2d 865 (2002); Mutual Group U.S. v. Higgins,

259 Neb. 616, 611 N.W.2d 404 (2000). Standing is a jurisdictional

component of a party's case because only a party who has standing

may invoke the jurisdiction of a court. Governor's Policy Research

Office v. KN Energy, supra; Miller v. City of Omaha, 260 Neb. 507,

618 N.W.2d 628 (2000).



· The purpose of an inquiry as to standing is to determine whether

one has a legally protectable interest or right in the controversy

that would benefit by the relief to be granted. Crosby v. Luehrs,

supra; Hradecky v. State, supra. In order to have standing, a

litigant must assert the litigant's own legal rights and interests

and cannot rest his or her claim on the legal rights or interests of

third parties. Id. The litigant must have some legal or equitable

right, title, or interest in the subject of the controversy. See,

Crosby v. Luehrs, supra; Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, 263 Neb. 920,

644 N.W.2d 540 (2002).



North Carolina: Tilley v. Diamond, NO. COA06-500, 2007

N.C. App. LEXIS 1591 (unpub.) (N.C. Ct. App., 2007): · Jurisdiction

is "[t]he legal power and authority of a court to make a decision

that binds the parties to any matter properly brought before

it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (7th ed. 1999) (defining judicial

jurisdiction). . . . "A universal principle as old as the law

is that the proceedings of a court without jurisdiction of the

subject matter are a nullity." Subject matter jurisdiction is the

indispensable foundation upon which valid judicial decisions rest,

and in its absence a court has no power to act: A judgment is void,

when there is a want of jurisdiction by the court over the subject

matter . . . . "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. No

rights are acquired or divested by it. It neither binds nor bars

any one, and all proceedings founded upon it are worthless." In re

T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 590, 636 S.E.2d 787, 789-90 (2006) (quoting

Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964)),

and Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 673,

678 (1956)) (internal citation omitted).



***

· Standing has been defined as "whether a party has a sufficient

stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy so as to properly seek

adjudication of the matter." Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield

Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 114, 574 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2002). "If a

party does not have standing to bring a claim, a court has no subject

matter jurisdiction to hear the claim." Estate of Apple v. Commercial

Courier Express, Inc., 168 N.C. App. 175, 177, 607 S.E.2d 14, 16,

disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 632, 613 S.E.2d 688 (2005).



North Carolina: Estate of Apple v. Commercial Courier Express,

Inc., 168 N.C. App. 175, 177, 607 S.E.2d 14 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005):

· If a party does not have standing to bring a claim, a court has

no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. See Neuse River

Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C. App. 110, 113,

574 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2002).



Ohio: Black v. Aristech Chem. Co., Case No. 07CA3155, 2008 Ohio

7038; 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 5890 (Ohio Ct. App., 4th Dist., Scioto

County, December 23, 2008): · Subject-matter jurisdiction describes

a court's "statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the

case." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment (1998), 523

U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210; see, also, Pratts, at

P11. "Once a tribunal has jurisdiction over both the subject matter

of an action and the parties to it, '* * * the right to hear and

determine is perfect; and the decision of every question thereafter

arising is but the exercise of the jurisdiction thus conferred * *

*.'" State ex rel. Pizza v. Rayford (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 382, 384,

582 N.E.2d 992, quoting Sheldon's Lessee v. Newton (1854), 3 Ohio

St. 494, 499. "[A] judgment rendered by a court lacking subject

matter jurisdiction is void ab initio." Patton v. Diemer (1988),

35 Ohio St.3d 68, 70, 518 N.E.2d 941; see, also, Pratts, at P12.



· In addition to subject-matter jurisdiction, a court must

also have jurisdiction over a particular case. See Pratts, at

P12. "'"[J]urisdiction over the particular case encompasses the trial

court's authority to determine a specific case within that class

of cases that is within its subject matter jurisdiction."'" Id.,

quoting State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 2002 Ohio 2833, 769

N.E.2d 846, at P22 (Cook, J., dissenting), quoting State v. Swiger

(1998), 125 Ohio App.3d 456, 462, 708 N.E.2d 1033. Unlike lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction which renders a judgment void, "'lack of

jurisdiction over the particular case merely renders the judgment

voidable.'" Id., quoting Parker at P22 (Cook, J., dissenting),

quoting Swiger, 125 Ohio App.3d at 462. Thus, "'"[w]here it is

apparent from the allegations that the matter alleged is within the

class of cases in which a particular court has been empowered to act,

jurisdiction is present. Any subsequent error in the proceedings is

only error in the 'exercise of jurisdiction,' as distinguished from

the want of jurisdiction in the first instance."'" Pratts, at P22,

quoting State v. Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 240, 1999 Ohio

99, 714 N.E.2d 867, quoting In re Waite (1991), 188 Mich.App. 189,

200, 468 N.W.2d 912. If a judgment is merely voidable, it may not

be collaterally attacked. See Clark v. Wilson (July 28, 2000),

Trumbull App. No. 2000-T-0063, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3400 (stating

that "if a judgment is deemed voidable, it will have the effect of

a proper legal order unless its propriety is successfully challenged

through a direct attack on the merits").



Ohio: State ex rel. Sautter v. Grey, CASE NO. 06-CA-6 , 2007 Ohio

1831; 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1673 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. Morrow

County, April 18, 2007): · "Jurisdiction has been described as

'a word of many, too many, meanings.'" Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio

St.3d 81, 88, 2004 Ohio 1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, quoting United States

v. Vanness (C.A .D.C.1996), 318 U.S. App. D.C. 95, 85 F.3d 661,

663, fn. 2. Because the term "jurisdiction" is used in various

contexts and often is not properly clarified, misinterpretation

and confusion has resulted. Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d at 88."



· 'Jurisdiction' means 'the courts' statutory or constitutional

power to adjudicate the case.' "Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d at

83, quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment (1998),

523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (emphasis

omitted); Morrison v. Steiner (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 290

N.E.2d 841, paragraph one of the syllabus; see, also, In re J.J.,

111 Ohio St.3d 205, 207, 2006 Ohio 5484, 855 N.E.2d 851. The term

"jurisdiction" "encompasses jurisdiction over the subject matter

and over the person." Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d at 83,

citing State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d 524, 529, 2002 Ohio 2833,

769 N.E.2d 846. (Cook, J., dissenting).



· "Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the

court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived

and may be challenged at any time." Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio

St.3d at 83, citing United States v. Cotton (2002), 535 U.S. 625,

630, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860; State ex rel. Tubbs

Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 1998 Ohio 275, 701

N.E.2d 1002, reconsideration denied (1999), 84 Ohio St. 3d 1475,

704 N.E.2d 582. A distinction exists between a court that lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and a court that improperly

exercises subject-matter jurisdiction once conferred upon it. Pratts

v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d at 83-84.



· Distinguishing between subject-matter jurisdiction and

jurisdiction over a particular case is important "because ' " '[i]t

is only where the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

that its judgment is void; lack of subject matter jurisdiction over

the particular case merely renders the judgment voidable' " ' "In

re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d at 207, quoting Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio

St.3d at 83, quoting State v. Parker, 95 Ohio St.3d at 529 (Cook,

J., dissenting), quoting State v. Swiger (1998), 125 Ohio App.3d

456, 462, 708 N.E.2d 1033. "Jurisdiction over the particular case,"

as the term implies, involves " ' "the trial court's authority to

determine a specific case within that class of cases that is within

its subject matter jurisdiction." ' " Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d at 83

quoting Swiger, 125 Ohio App.3d at 462.



· A void judgment is one rendered by a court lacking subject-matter

jurisdiction or the authority to act. Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio

St.3d at 84; State v. Beasley (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75, 14 Ohio

B. 511, 471 N.E.2d 774. A voidable judgment, on the other hand,

is a judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction/authority

and, although seemingly valid, is irregular and erroneous. State

v. Montgomery, Huron App. No. H-02-039, 2003 Ohio 4095.



· A voidable judgment is one rendered by a court having jurisdiction

and although seemingly valid, is irregular and erroneous. Black's

Law Dictionary (7 Ed.1999) 848. A voidable judgment is subject to

direct appeal, R.C. 2505.03(A), Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), Ohio

Constitution, and to the provisions of Civ.R. 60(B). A Civ.R. 60(B)

application for relief must be made to the trial court that rendered

the judgment from which relief is sought.



· As the Eleventh District Court of Appeals noted in Clark v. Wilson

(July 28, 2000), Trumbull App. No. 2000-T-0063, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS

3400: "The distinction between 'void' and 'voidable' is crucial. If

a judgment is deemed void, it is considered a legal nullity which

can be attacked collaterally. Conversely, if a judgment is deemed

voidable, it will have the effect of a proper legal order unless its

propriety is successfully challenged through a direct attack on the

merits. * * * " "Where it is apparent from the allegations that the

matter alleged is within the class of cases in which a particular

court has been empowered to act, jurisdiction is present. Any

subsequent error in the proceedings is only error in the 'exercise

of jurisdiction' as distinguished from the want of jurisdiction in

the first instance." State v Filiaggi (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 230,

240, 1999 Ohio 99, 714 N.E.2d 867, quoting In re Waite (1991),

188 Mich. App. 189, 200, 468 N.W.2d 912.



Ohio: Wash. Mut. Bank v. Novak, No. 88121 , 2007 Ohio 996; 2007 Ohio

App. LEXIS 990 (Ohio Ct. App, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 2007): ·

Civ.R. 17(A) provides in part that "every action shall be prosecuted

in the name of the real party in interest. * * * No action shall

be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of

the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed

after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by,

or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest. Such

ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect

as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party

in interest. "A "real party in interest" is "one who has a real

interest in the subject matter of the litigation, and not merely an

interest in the action itself, i.e., one who is directly benefitted

or injured by the outcome of the case." Shealy v. Campbell (1985),

20 Ohio St.3d 23, 24-25, 20 Ohio B. 210, 485 N.E.2d 701.



· If a claim is asserted by one who is not the real party in

interest, then the party lacks standing to prosecute the action,

but the court is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. See

State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St. 3d 70,

1998 Ohio 275, 701 N.E.2d 1002, citing State ex rel. Smith v. Smith

(1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 418, 420, 1996 Ohio 215, 662 N.E.2d 366, 369;

State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Gwin (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 245, 251,

1992 Ohio 20, 594 N.E.2d 616, 621.



· Because compliance with Civ.R. 17 is not necessary to invoke

the jurisdiction of the court of common pleas, State ex rel. Tubbs

Jones v. Suster; First Union Natl. Bank v. Hufford (2001), 146 Ohio

App.3d 673, 2001 Ohio 2271, 767 N.E.2d 1206, the failure to name

the real party in interest is an objection or defense to a claim

which is waived if not timely asserted. Id. See, also, MacLellan

v. Motorist Ins. Co. (Nov. 8, 1993), Cuyahoga App. No. 64090, 1993

Ohio App. LEXIS 5557; Mikolay v. Transcon Builders, Inc. (Jan. 22,

1981), Cuyahoga App. No. 42047, 1981 Ohio App. LEXIS 11690.



· Applying the foregoing to this matter, we initially note

that defendant offered no evidence to demonstrate that he was

entitled to relief from judgment under the grounds set forth in

Civ.R. 60(B)(1)-(5), as he simply claimed that Washington Mutual

was not the real party in interest. Further, defendant did not

raise this contention until five years after the complaint was

filed. Accordingly, the objection that Washington Mutual was not the

real party in interest was not timely raised as a matter of law and

was waived. First Union Natl. Bank v. Hufford, supra. We therefore

do not accept defendant's claim that the default was "void" such

that he is entitled to relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B).



Oregon: Lincoln Loan Co. v. City of Portland, SC S51666 ,

340 Ore. 613; 136 P.3d 1; 2006 Ore. LEXIS 469, (Or. 2006): The

court cites Clawson et ux v. Prouty et ux, 215 Ore. 244, 249,

333 P.2d 1104 (1959) for the proposition that: · "Every court

confronted with a law suit of any kind is under both the necessity

and the duty of determining whether or not it has jurisdiction to

entertain the suit, and it necessarily has jurisdiction to make

this determination." (internal quotations and citations omitted.



Texas: In the Interest of CMC, 192 SW3d 866, 869 (Tex App., 2006):

· Standing, as a necessary component of a court's subject-matter

jurisdiction, is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining a

suit under Texas law. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,

852 S.W.2d 440, 444, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 607 (Tex. 1993). If a party

lacks standing, a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear

a case. Id.

***



· [A] decision concerning whether a party has standing is not

a decision deciding the merits of a case. See Blue, 34 S.W.3d

at 554. "A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the

purpose of which is to defeat a cause of action without regard to

whether the claims asserted have merit." Id. Without subject-matter

jurisdiction, the trial court must dismiss the case. Am. Motorists

Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 805, 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 122

(Tex. 2001). Dismissal is the appropriate disposition when a

party lacks standing; it is not a decision on the merits of the

case. Texas: Whitworth v. Whitworth, NO. 01-04-01026-CV , 222 S.W.3d

616; 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 2238, Tex, Ct. App., 1st Dist., Houston,

March 16, 2007):



· Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter

jurisdiction. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 22 S.W.3d at 853; Doncer

v. Dickerson, 81 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2002, no

pet.). Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority

of a court to decide a case. Texas Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at

443. Standing, as a necessary component of a court's subject matter

jurisdiction, is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining

suit. Id. at 444; In re C.M.C. & J.T.C., 192 S.W.3d 866, 869

(Tex. App.--Texarkana 2006) (orig. proceeding). The standing

requirement under Texas law stems from two limitations on subject

matter jurisdiction: the separation of powers doctrine and the open

courts provision, "which contemplates access to the courts only

for those litigants suffering an injury." Texas Ass'n of Bus.,

852 S.W.2d at 443-44; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351

(1992) (standing in federal law is essential and unchangeable

requirement of case-or-controversy requirement of Article III

of Constitution). Standing in Texas state court requires (a) "a

real controversy between the parties" that (b) "will be actually

determined by the declaration sought." Texas Ass'n of Bus.,

852 S.W.2d at 446. Subject matter jurisdiction is never presumed

and cannot be waived. Id. at 443-44. If a party lacks standing,

a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at

444; In re C.M.C., 192 S.W.3d at 869. Vermont: Bischoff v. Bletz,

No. 07-001, 2008 VT 16; 949 A.2d 420; 2008 Vt. LEXIS 9 (Vt. 2008):



· Vermont courts have "subject matter jurisdiction only over

actual cases or controversies involving litigants with adverse

interests." Brod v. Agency of Natural Res., 2007 VT 87, 8, 182

Vt. 234, 936 A.2d 1286. One element of the "case or controversy

requirement is that plaintiffs must have standing, that is, they

must have suffered a particular injury that is attributable to

the defendant and that can be redressed by a court of law." Parker

v. Town of Milton, 169 Vt. 74, 77, 726 A.2d 477, 480 (1998). Without

standing, the court has no jurisdiction over a petition for

declaratory relief. See Brod, 2007 VT 87, 2 (plaintiff "must

demonstrate standing for a court to have jurisdiction over a petition

for declaratory relief" (quotation omitted)); Ladd v. Valerio,

2005 VT 81, 3, 178 Vt. 614, 883 A.2d 764 (mem.) ("Every petition

for declaratory relief must be rooted in an actual controversy

between the parties; otherwise, the plaintiff lacks standing to sue,

and the courts have no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.");

Parker, 169 Vt. at 77, 726 A.2d at 480 (explaining that standing is

jurisdictional requirement in declaratory-judgment actions because

declaratory judgments "can only provide a declaration of rights,

status, and other legal relations of parties to an actual or

justiciable controversy" (quotation omitted)).



· Because standing is a necessary component of the court's

subject-matter jurisdiction, it cannot be waived, and its absence

can be raised at any time. See Brod, 2007 VT 87, 2 (equating Court's

review of dismissal for lack of standing in declaratory-judgment

action with dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction);

Town of Charlotte v. Richmond, 158 Vt. 354, 357-58, 609 A.2d 638,

640 (1992) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can

be raised at any time); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 n.4

(11th Cir. 1994) (noting that standing cannot be waived and may be

asserted at any stage of litigation); Palmer v. Bahm, 2006 MT 29,

16, 331 Mont. 105, 128 P.3d 1031 (stating that standing is "threshold

requirement of every case" and may be raised at any time); see also

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d

343 (1975) ("The rules of standing … are threshold determinants

of the propriety of judicial intervention.").



Virginia: Porter v. Commonwealth, Record Nos. 071928 & 071929,

276 Va. 203; 661 S.E.2d 415; 2008 Va. LEXIS 78 (Va. 2008):

· Jurisdiction is a term which can engender much confusion

because it encompasses a variety of separate and distinct legal

concepts. We addressed this topic and differentiated the categories

of jurisdiction in Morrison v. Bestler, 239 Va. 166, 387 S.E.2d

753, 6 Va. Law Rep. 1125 (1990). A court may lack the requisite

"jurisdiction" to proceed to an adjudication on the merits for a

variety of reasons. The term jurisdiction embraces several concepts

including subject matter jurisdiction, which is the authority granted

through constitution or statute to adjudicate a class of cases or

controversies; territorial jurisdiction, that is, authority over

persons, things, or occurrences located in a defined geographic

area; notice jurisdiction, or effective notice to a party or if the

proceeding is in rem seizure of a res; and "the other conditions

of fact must exist which are demanded by the unwritten or statute

law as the prerequisites of the authority of the court to proceed

to judgment or decree." Farant Inv. Corp. v. Francis, 138 Va. 417,

427-28, 122 S.E. 141, 144 (1924).



· While these elements are necessary to enable a court to proceed to

a valid judgment, there is a significant difference between subject

matter jurisdiction and the other "jurisdictional" elements. Subject

matter jurisdiction alone cannot be waived or conferred on the

court by agreement of the parties. Lucas v. Biller, 204 Va. 309,

313, 130 S.E.2d 582, 585 (1963). A defect in subject matter

jurisdiction cannot be cured by reissuance of process, passage of

time, or pleading amendment. While a court always has jurisdiction

to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction, a judgment

on the merits made without subject matter jurisdiction is null and

void. Barnes v. American Fert. Co., 144 Va. 692, 705, 130 S.E. 902,

906 (1925). Likewise, any subsequent proceeding based on such a

defective judgment is void or a nullity. Ferry Co. v. Commonwealth,

196 Va. 428, 432, 83 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1954). Even more significant,

the lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time in

the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal by the court sua

sponte. Thacker v. Hubard, 122 Va. 379, 386, 94 S.E. 929, 930 (1918).



· In contrast, defects in the other jurisdictional elements

generally will be considered waived unless raised in the pleadings

filed with the trial court and properly preserved on appeal. Rule

5:25.



· One consequence of the non-waivable nature of the requirement of

subject matter jurisdiction is that attempts are sometimes made to

mischaracterize other serious procedural errors as defects in subject

matter jurisdiction to gain an opportunity for review of matters

not otherwise preserved. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments,

§ 11 (1980).Id. at 169-70, 387 S.E.2d at 755-56.



· Our recitation in Morrison reflects the long-standing distinction

between subject matter jurisdiction, which cannot be granted or

waived by the parties and the lack of which renders an act of the

court void, and territorial jurisdiction or venue. The latter goes

to the authority of the court to act in particular circumstances or

places and is waived if not properly and timely raised. The judgment

of a court which is defective in territorial jurisdiction or venue

is thus only voidable and not void. Id.; Southern Sand and Gravel

Company, Inc. v. Massaponax Sand and Gravel Corporation, 145 Va. 317,

326, 133 S.E. 812, 814 (1926). sub-mat-jurisd-alph
I am that i am....attempting to listen to the silence, and gaze upon the empty space, to feel my inner body, just to be, to be here and now, Now I can take action thats truth, being, love, peace freedom and joy
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Re: Who are we and where do we stand?

Postby woodwoods » Wed Jun 29, 2011 12:19 pm

I AND I........LONE WOLF you are not Alone, and even if thier? SHIT! is in place to control! Thier expectations failed miserably! We may not win? but that wasn't the game!.........So the new game, and i love it to death is on!
namaste
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Re: Who are we and where do we stand?

Postby woodwoods » Wed Jun 29, 2011 12:29 pm

never said what i intended to say? unless you all can read between the lines? My Brothers and Sisters?
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Re: Who are we and where do we stand?

Postby pedawson » Wed Jun 29, 2011 1:09 pm

If they hold all the cards, then who are they playing with?
Especially when the rest of us are playing dominoes

Namaste, phil
Don't be surprised to discover that luck favours those who are prepared
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Re: Who are we and where do we stand?

Postby woodwoods » Thu Jun 30, 2011 2:58 pm

Themselves!
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