This is a précis of the "101 Statute for Cops" thread viewtopic.php?f=17&t=6707&start=0#p59572
This condenses all the important points to one post, without any side issues which inevitably creep into threads.
The information below is important to all people who consider themselves to be subjects of the United Kingdom. It is not a "freeman" remedy, but it certainly is a remedy to "freemen" who constantly find themselves being subjected to the over bearing approaches of the government and their agencies seeking to draw them back under government control. Remember, we are not limited to one defence when under attack....."we are not subject to your law, but if you pursue your course of action, then we stipulate we are subject to this law".
We begin -
1. To pre-fine someone in England is contrary with the Bill of Rights Act 1688, "And severall Grants and Promises made of Fines and Forfeitures before any Conviction or Judgement against the Persons upon whome the same were to be levyed. All which are utterly directly contrary to the knowne Lawes and Statutes and Freedome of this Realme".
2. To pre-fine someone in Scotland is contrary with the Claim of Right Act 1689, "By imposeing exorbitant fines to the value of the pairties Estates exacting extravagant Baile and disposeing fines and forefaultors befor any proces or Conviction"....."All which are utterly and directly contrairy to the knoune lawes statutes and freedomes of this realme".
3. ANY Act (and I mean that in all senses of the word) which prevents a subject from enjoying their right to travel within the UK is "contrary and inconsistent" with the Acts of Union 1706 and 1707 Article 4 -
"That all the Subjects of the United Kingdom of Great Britain shall from and after the Union have full freedom and Intercourse of Trade and Navigation to and from any port or place within the said United Kingdom and the Dominions and Plantations thereunto belonging And that there be a Communication of all other Rights Privileges and Advantages which do or may belong to the Subjects of either Kingdom except where it is otherwise expressly agreed in these Articles."
and Article 25 -
"That all Laws and Statutes in either Kingdom so far as they are contrary to or inconsistent with the Terms of these Articles or any of them shall from and after the Union cease and become void and shall be so declared to be by the respective Parliaments of the said Kingdoms"
That means parking tickets, FPN's, PCN's, driving licences, car insurance, MOT's, road tax, speeding and so on....infact ANYTHING which restricts our "FULL FREEDOM".
These are Constitutional Acts and are paramount.
------------S------------Communis error no facit jus. (A common error does not make law.)
Those laws that contradict the, un-repealed Acts (above) are explicitly in error Ab initio
(from the beginning)
The position as it stands at present is Communis error facit jus.(A common error makes law)
Another expression for this idea is "common opinion," or communis opinio. In ancient Rome, the phrase expressed the notion that a generally accepted opinion or belief about a legal issue makes that opinion or belief the law. Judges have pointed out that universal opinion may also be universal error. Until the error is discovered, however, the belief continues to be the law.
The "error" has now been discovered.
Police have a sworn oath to uphold the law without fear or favour, all law, not some of it.
They have the authority to use discretion when enforcing the law, but no discretion as to which laws.
Ignorance is no defence, as we are often told, by bringing this to the notice of the government and agencies any further enforcement of laws which are "contrary or inconsistent" with the Articles of Union is :
FRAUD by abuse of position AND false representation to make a gain for himself or another or to cause loss to another or to expose another to a risk of loss and
TREASON. If a constable acts contrary to their oath they are guilty of perjury and treason. If they try to persuade others to do so they are guilty of sedition in the case of both private persons and constables.
s. 91 of the Police Act 1996 also applies:
"91 Causing disaffection.
(1)Any person who causes, or attempts to cause, or does any act calculated to cause, disaffection amongst the members of any police force, or induces or attempts to induce, or does any act calculated to induce, any member of a police force to withhold his services, shall be guilty of an offence and liable—
(a)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both;
(b)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, or to both.
Constitutions are not just plain old laws. They are what control law makers and define what would be treason. They are the rules that Parliament, the House of Lords, and the Crown must abide by. Constitutions are in place to stop illegal laws and is also the reason why Judges over the centuries have acknowledged that a jury has the final say on any law, not a Judge.
In the Law of Nations by Emmerich da Vattel (the one the Americans based their constitution on) it states :
Book 1 - Chapter 3 - 34.
In short, it is from the constitution that those legislators derive their power: how then can they change it without destroying the foundation of their own authority?
By hiding constitutional acts and enforcing the "shiny new ones" the police/government have de facto destroyed the foundation and with it their authority.
Bill of Rights.
BOWLES V. BANK OF ENGLAND,  1 Ch. 57, 84-85
By the statute 1 W. & M., usually known as the Bill of Rights, it was finally settled that there could be no taxation in this country except under authority of an Act of Parliament. The Bill of Rights still remains un-repealed, and no practice or custom, however prolonged, or however acquiesced in on the part of the subject, can be relied on by the Crown as justifying any infringement of its provisions. It follows that, with regard to the powers of the Crown to levy taxation, no resolution, either of the Committee for Ways and Means or of the House itself, has any legal effect whatever. Such resolutions are necessitated by a parliamentary procedure adopted with a view to the protection of the subject against the hasty imposition of taxes, and it would be strange to find them relied on as justifying the Crown in levying a tax before such tax is actually imposed by Act of Parliament.
In the case of NEIL ANDREW HERRON & another v THE PARKING ADJUDICATOR and SUNDERLAND CITY COUNCIL ,
MR JUSTICE KEITH stated in paragraph 9 of the Approved Judgement [2009 EWHC 1702 (Admin)]:
“The allegation of lack of independence on the part of parking adjudicators was considered by Collins J in R (Crittenden) v National Parking Adjudication Service  EWHC 2170 (Admin) and on appeal by Scott Baker LJ at  EWCA 1786 (Civ).
Permission to proceed with the claim for judicial review was refused. The claim was academic in that case because the parking adjudicator had allowed Mr Crittenden’s appeal, but in any event the court rejected as unarguable the allegation of lack of independence.
However, the principal point taken in that case was that the whole system of penalty charges was unlawful because it contravened the prohibition in the Bill of Rights against fines or forfeiture before conviction or judgment against the persons upon whom the fines and forfeiture were to be levied.”
Acts of Union.
Steve Thoburn v Sunderland City Council; Colin Hunt v London Borough of Hackney; Julian Harman and John Dove v Cornwall County Council; Peter Collins v London Borough of Sutton
All five appellants, popularised by the press as the "metric martyrs", contested the decisions against them by way of Case Stated before the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division.
The judgment of Lord Justice Laws in the Divisional Court (sections 62 and 63), said :
“The special status of constitutional statutes follows the special status of constitutional rights. Examples are the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of Union, the Reform Acts which distributed and enlarged the franchise, the HRA, the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998.
Ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed. Constitutional statutes may not. For the repeal of a constitutional Act or the abrogation of a fundamental right to be effected by statute, the court would apply this test: is it shown that the legislature’s actual – not imputed, constructive or presumed – intention was to effect the repeal or abrogation? I think the test could only be met by express words in the later statute, or by words so specific that the inference of an actual determination to effect the result contended for was irresistible. The ordinary rule of implied repeal does not satisfy this test. Accordingly, it has no application to constitutional statutes. I should add that in my judgment general words could not be supplemented, so as to effect a repeal or significant amendment to a constitutional statute, by reference to what was said in Parliament by the minister promoting the Bill pursuant to Pepper v Hart  AC 593. A constitutional statute can only be repealed, or amended in a way which significantly affects its provisions touching fundamental rights or otherwise the relation between citizen and State, by unambiguous words on the face of the later statute.”
From Wiki :
In this category of "constitutional statutes" Laws identified the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Acts of Union 1707, the Reform Acts, the Human Rights Act 1998, the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998 and the European Communities Act 1972. Such statutes are, because of their constitutional importance, to be protected from implied repeal and, whilst not entrenched in English law, can only be repealed by the express intervention of Parliament. Laws noted that the question of whether the European Communities Act was affected by implied repeal had already been determined by the House of Lords in Factortame. In this case, the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 had in effect impliedly repealed Section 2(2) of the 1972 Act by authorising a discrimination contrary to Community law, but the Lords did not recognise this authorisation as operating as such.