Subject: Crown Court Appeal, Derby, 14th March 2014.
From: Veronica
Date: 17/3/14 6:42 pm
To: undisclosed-recipients:;

We know that Crown Courts are vastly more ’professional’ than Maggots Circuses. This does NOT mean that Crown Courts are not ‘infested with arseholes’.

It means two things:

1.       We know of at least one … and now possibly two (see below) … Crown Court Judges who seem do their job utterly professionally … and …


2.        even the ‘infestations’ are ‘reasonably professional’ (aka ‘cunning’) about the way they ‘infest’. (See "Stitch-Up in St. Albans").



1.        June 2013 … car clocked at 37 mph in a 30 limit by a Speed Camera.

2.       Subsequent notices received, and overwritten with things like “I do not understand or stand under this notice. Cameras have no standing in law” … and posted back.

3.       Summons received for 12th December 2013 … which I was not able to attend. The result of 12th December was a ‘conviction’ for “37 mph in a 30 limit” … £745 fine + 6 points.

4.       SOMETIME BETWEEN THEN AND 3rd February 2014 … this ‘conviction’ morphed into a ‘conviction’ for “failing to name driver” … with same fine + points.

5.       Summons for 3rd February received, which I attended, and obtained an adjournment until the 24th February … to give time to raise a Crown Court Appeal.

6.       Appeal listed in Derby Crown Court for last Friday, 14th March … notification received just in time for the 24th February Hearing … which we went to … but were ignored (but we didn’t really care).

7.       So it all hung on the Appeal, last Friday.

8.       Well, I knew that a Crown Court Appeal could just be a re-run of the Maggots Circus ‘charade’ but … me being me … I wrote this Appeal Notice ‘to see what would happen’.

Appeal Notice from “Mr. John Montague”

1.       This Appeal relates to events taking place in Chesterfield Magistrates Court on 12th December, 2013, Court 4, Case Number 301300238654.

2.       This Appeal should not be considered “out of time” for two reasons:

a.       The grant to it was agreed in South Derbyshire Magistrates Court on 3rd February 2014, because the possibility of said Appeal became apparent at that time, and an Adjournment was created  in order to create time for same. This was due to the fact that (as seen below), the original conviction was cancelled, and an alternative one inserted. The date of the alternate conviction is assumed to be prior 3rd February 2014, but no specific date is available.

b.      This Appeal relates to Common Law offences, believed to be committed in Chesterfield Magistrates Court, on 12th December 2013. There is no time limit on Common Law offences.

3.       A Defendant, named as “Mr. John Montague”, had been summonsed (at said time and date) to answer a charge of “Speeding” contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988.

4.       The charge was based on information collected from a Speed Camera.

5.       “Mr. John Montague” had been summonsed by virtue of the fact that the vehicle in question was registered in that name.

6.       Furthermore, the Car Insurance for said vehicle was established in the name “Mr. John Montague”.

7.       However, it is perfectly possible that Defendant was not, actually, the driver at the time. This being due to the fact that relatives of the Defendant are authorised to drive the vehicle under their own car insurance (obviously with the permission of Defendant)

8.       Therefore the driver, at the time, is not known with any degree of certainty. Defendant believed that “best guess” could amount to Perjury.

9.       These facts were ignored in the proceedings that took place in Chesterfield Magistrates Court, on the 12th December 2013.

10.   Instead, Defendant, who turned up to answer the charge, was overtalked, ignored, and subjected to a considerable amount of intimidation, as he tried to make points of law.

11.   Defendant felt as though he was in front of a group of people ‘baying for his blood’.

12.   Defendant said “I cannot name the driver. I am not prepared to plead. There is no case to answer”.

13.   These statements were witnessed, and corresponding Witness Statements are attached to this Appeal.

14.   What subsequently occurred, was that a plea was entered “on behalf of” Defendant, which resulted in a conviction, and a sentence of £745 plus 6 Licence Points.

15.   It is the basis of this Appeal, that whoever entered the plea, was doing so without the grant of Power of Attorney so to do.

16.   It is therefore averred, that the person entering the plea should be taking all personal and Commercial Liability and Responsibility for the outcome i.e. the conviction and sentence imposed.

17.   The express grant of Power of Attorney is the only lawful mechanism for being able to speak and/or act on someone else’s behalf.

18.   That grant was never given, and in fact expressly denied, by the statements above, viz: “I am not prepared to plead. There is no case to answer”.

19.   It is therefore submitted that “entering a plea on behalf of Defendant”, absent any authority so to do, constituted a Rush to Judgment, and:

a.       The rush to judgment resulted in an abuse of process;

b.      The rush to judgment resulted in a perversion of the course of justice;

c.       The rush to judgment resulted in misconduct in public/judicial office;

d.      The entire proceedings were improper, and therefore the conviction is void ab initio.

20.   For some reason (presumably ‘internal’) the conviction for “Speeding” was subsequently ‘administratively’ cancelled (the Defendant does not know why, because no reason has been given).

21.   In its place, a conviction for “Failing to name the driver” has been inserted (as far as Defendant can determine) in absentia.

22.   The sentence, for this subsequent conviction, remains the same (£745 Fine, and 6 Licence Points), giving the apparency that of some ‘sleight of hand’ has taken place in absentia.

23.   On a further point of law, the Defendant obtained his licence to drive in 1958. Thus the Defendant entered into a lawfully-binding Contract of Obligation to act in accordance with the Road Traffic Act at the time. Subsequently the obligations under that Act have been changed more than once, thereby changing the Terms & Conditions of the Contract. This is an unacceptable way to perform a Contract, in Law, and constitutes Breach of Contract on the part of the State. Thus Defendant is not obligated, in any way (in Law), to recognise the Terms & Conditions of the Road Traffic Act 1988, and no-one can be penalised for an act they are not obligated to recognise.

24.   Defendant has never been asked if he will enter into obligations under the Road Traffic Act 1988, and no document exists bearing Defendant’s signature of agreement.

25.   Defendant asserts that he is not a Slave, nor is he Chattel of the State, but is a Human Being with a Living Soul, and with free will to enter into obligations of his choosing. In short, Defendant asserts that “Since all are equal under the law”, his Consent is equal, in every respect, to that of anyone else.

26.   Defendant also asserts that he is a Peaceful Man, who fully understands his Duty of Care to all other Peaceful Men (and Women), and that he has a Spiritual Obligation to act and interact peacefully at all times.

27.   Defendant asserts that the previous two principles, above, are the same for everyone.

28.   If, on the other hand, Defendant can be penalised for consented obligations under the Road Traffic Act that was in force in 1958, then there is no forensic evidence that could determine actis rea. Because there was no Speed Camera located at that location – or indeed any location – in 1958. At that time the Police would have been required to follow a vehicle, note its speed, and stop the vehicle. The Police would then know precisely who was driving, and consequently who to Charge.

29.   On a further point of law, ‘lawful conviction’ requires proof of ‘guilt’. And guilt requires proof of two components, namely actis rea and mens rea. If (hypothetically) it is assumed that actis rea has been forensically-determined by the Speed Camera, there is still the component of mens rea to consider. This raises the question of ‘intent’: Was the intent to deliberately commit the actis rea – possibly causing injury to the driver and others – or was the intent to “arrive at a destination”? “Arriving at a destination” is a perfectly lawful intent.

30.   Where is the investigation as to why a speed of 37 miles per hour was occurring? Where is the evidence to show that the driver – at the time – was not simply trying to accelerate away from someone tailgating the vehicle? In order to achieve the perfectly lawful INTENT of “Arriving at a destination” SAFELY?

31.   It is submitted that Rush to Judgment, in Chesterfield Magistrates Court, which prevented any of these arguments being made, created a void assessment of Defendant’s guilt, and hence a void conviction.

32.   It is requested, by this Appeal, that the conviction should be quashed, on the basis of it being null & void.

33.   This Appeal is submitted as above.


9.        The fundamental points being the Magna Carta 1215, and the grabbing of Power of Attorney plucked out of the Maggot’s arseholes.


Magna Carta 1215:


[20] A free man shall not be amerced for a trivial offence except in accordance with the degree of the offence, and for a grave offence he shall be amerced in accordance with its gravity,  yet saving his way of living; and a merchant in the same way,  saving his stock-in-trade; and a villein shall be amerced in the same way,  saving his means of livelihood--if they have fallen into our mercy: and none of the aforesaid amercements shall be imposed  except by the oath of good men of the neighbourhood.


[30] No sheriff, or bailiff of ours, or anyone else shall take the horses or carts of any free man for transport work save with the agreement of that freeman.


[39] No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights and possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by the law of the land. (Defines Petty Juries)


[45] We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or other officials, only men that know the law of the realm and are minded to keep it well.

Question re Article 20, above:  The offence was trivial. If one takes the 10% inaccuracy in Speedometers, then no-one should be charged with anything up to 33mph in a 30 limit. The difference between 33mph & 37mph = 4 mph ... AVERAGE WALKING PACE. Trivial. But then, to fine someone £745 for that? Would "good men in any neighbourhood" do that? I suggest not. So, maybe those who came up with that fine, could not be considered to be "good men"? 

So … what happened n Derby Crown Court?

In the waiting area the CPS Prosecutor came up, introduced himself, and said: “Is there anything I can help you with?

I said: “What do you mean?

He said: “Well, this hearing today will be simply to define the Appeal … how long it will take … what witnesses to call, etc.

I said: “OK. I had more or less assumed that, but I don’t see how you can call a Speed Camera as a witness … but obviously we will be calling the Clerk of Chesterfield Magistrates' Court and the two Magistrates”.

He gave me a funny look. We found out why, when we went into court.

When the time came, we were shepherded into the Court by a very ‘professional’ lady who seemed to know what she was doing … I got the feeling she was more than just a simple Usher. She told us to go and take our places at the back, which we did.

The Judge (HHJ Pini) then asked us who we were, I told him. He asked me who I was, and I told him ... and that I had Power of Attorney to speak for my friend. The Judge said “OK”.

The CPS Prosecutor then stood up and did his spiel, referring to the letters returned with  I do not understand or stand under this notice. Cameras have no standing in law”. I was asked whether or not this was true, and said “Yes”.

And that sort of thing.

During this time, HHJ Pini referred to my Appeal Notice. The CPS Prosecutor said he didn’t know what the Judge was talking about (which explains the funny look the Prosecutor gave me outside).

Pini arranged for the ‘professional lady’ to photocopy the pages he was referring to.

As she disappeared to do that, I said: “Your honour, I can lend … … and Pini said: “No, that’s fine, we can just wait”.

Anyway, once the CPS Prosecutor had his copy, Pini started reading out my points 10 & 11:

10.   Instead, Defendant, who turned up to answer the charge, was overtalked, ignored, and subjected to a considerable amount of intimidation, as he tried to make points of law.

11.   Defendant felt as though he was in front of a group of people ‘baying for his blood’.

I thought: “Holy Shit. The Judge is taking this SERIOUSLY! He’s taking it seriously!”

And I was right.

When it came my turn to speak, a discussion ensued, and he pointed out that we had two choices:

1.       To continue with the Appeal, which would be simply a re-run of the Maggot’s Circus … but in Pini’s Court … on which case all the same CPS evidence would be used … for example the way the letters had been returned, etc . ...




2.       To take the matter in my Appeal Notice to “Divisional Court”.

Fundamentally he pointed out that the matters raised in my Appeal Notice were ‘beyond his jurisdiction’.



So I said: “You mean a Judicial Review, Your Honour?

And Pini said: “Yes, that’s right”.

So I said that’s what we would do, and withdraw the Appeal Request.

Pini then asked the CPS Prosecutor if there: “… were any costs associated?” . The Prosecutor said nothing, and shrugged as if he were in a daze.

So we left the Court.

As I walked out, the ‘professional lady’ was walking just behind me (to call in the next lot).

I said, openly: “I think I just made a mistake”.

She said: “No … you didn’t … you did it exactly right” … and then walked away.

I’m sure she was more than an Usher.

So that’s the result of last Friday.

It’s time for a Judicial Review: “By what ‘right’ can a Magistrates’ Court engage in a form of Identity Theft, by grabbing Power of Attorney out of thin air … just so that THEY can proceed against you, rather than having a Common Law Jury decide the matter?

“What is the essential difference in proceeding – in that manner - to a fine of £745 … and simply cloning your WiFi-enabled Credit Card … and then just going to an ATM ... and drawing £745 out of your account?”

As far as I can see that’s just two different methods of Identity Theft (which are both CRIMINAL).